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Judicial Institutionalization of the
Revolution: The Legal Systems of the
People's Republic of China and the
Republic of Cuba
I. INTRODUCTION
A revolution is defined as "a violent rejection of the legal order of
the past,"' and is characterized by a fervor of judicial iconoclasm in
the new regime.2 However, if the new regime is to survive beyond the
life of its founders without resorting to tyranny, it must promulgate a
new and stable legal order.3 When a revolution is led by a highly
visible, charismatic leader, it often results in legal instability and in-
consistency because the leader tends to rule by improvisation. 4 So
long as the leader retains the prestige and admiration of the popula-
tion, the regime is secure. 5 In contrast, when the leader dies, or no
longer enjoys popular support, the new regime will not survive unless
it has established a predictable, pragmatic, and stable legal system. 6
1. Harold J. Berman & Van R. Whiting, Impressions of Cuban Law, 28 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 475, 485 (1980). Cuban President Fidel Castro said, "[R]evolution signifies the destruction
of the old social order and all the old laws that regulate the life of a society, and replaces them
all with new laws." Nelson P. Vald6s, Revolution and Institutionalization in Cuba, 6 CUBAN
STUD./ESTUDIOS CUBANOS 1, 16 (1976).
2. In a 1971 speech, Fidel Castro noted that the first phase of Cuban revolutionary
institutionalization was marked by "iconoclasticism [sic] in relation to laws; we have to de-
stroy the system, destroy its laws, destroy everything." Luis Salas, The Judicial System of
Postrevolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA L. J. 43, 44 (1983). Following the successful overthrow of the
Guomindang government in 1949, "the Chinese Communist regime... repealed all the laws of
the nationalist government because such laws stressed the interests of the bourgeois class and
the feudal society." Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1413
(1987). In the Soviet Union, "Lenin's regime dissolved the courts, dismissed government at-
torneys, and disbanded the organized bar." JOHN S. RESHETAR JR., THE SOVIET POLITY:
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE USSR 254 (3d ed. 1989).
3. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 485. See also Max Weber, The Genesis and
Transformation of Charismatic Authority, in 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1121, 1123 (Geunther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (arguing that if charismatic regimes wish to transform them-
selves into perennial institutions, they must move in the direction of legal regulation).
4. See Edward Gonzalez, Cuba's Political Structure: Institutional Development of a
Revolutionary State 1 (May 16-17, 1983) (unpublished paper presented at the International
Conference held in Bonn, Germany, on "Cuba in the Eighties").
5. See Vald6s, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining that charismatic authority is unstable be-
cause there are no firm rules).
6. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 485. See also Weber, supra note 3, at 1121.
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Revolutionary regimes face unique problems when they attempt
to convert themselves into legitimate governments. 7 Foremost, the re-
gimes are forced upon a country too quickly to be accepted by a large
majority of the population.8 Initially, a lack of majority support is not
problematic because the regime's right to govern has not been granted
by democratic principles, but rather by military superiority.9 While
such tyranny may be tolerated for a brief period of time, it does not
provide for a stable and lasting government. 10
The most significant weakness of a government that both attains
and maintains its power through force is that it is defenseless against
the use of force by others. I The government cannot morally oppose
the violent tactics of its opposition since the government itself used
such tactics against its predecessor.1 2 Thus, the only way a revolu-
tionary government can justify the use of force against its opposition
is by passing itself off as the free expression of the people's will. 1 3 But,
in so doing, the revolutionary government inevitably "camouflage[s]
its despotism by a parody of freedom which renders its despotism
even more intolerable and against which the human intellect... will
always revolt."14 The ruling class, apprehensive about public opposi-
tion, ultimately becomes the victim of its own oppression.1 5
"When the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life flows back into the
channels of workday routines,. . . the 'pure' form of charismatic domination will wane and
turn into an 'institution'." Id. See also Vald6s, supra note 1, at 13; JUAN M. DEL AGUILA,
CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTION 163-65 (1988).
7. A legitimate government is one in which "power is conferred and exercised according
to principles and rules accepted without discussion by those who must obey." GUGLIELMO
FERRERO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER: THE GREAT POLITICAL CRISES OF HISTORY 135
(1942). Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, main-
tains that a government's legitimacy depends on "its capacity to govern, to secure obedience,
to punish those who disobey-in sum, to maintain order." JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, DICTA-
TORSHIPS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: RATIONALISM AND REASON IN POLITICS 83 (1982).
8. FERRERO, supra note 7, at 187.
9. Id. at 22. Ferrero states that "[t]he right to govern can only be justified by superiority
.... A majority proves nothing: neither the ability of a man or a party, nor the truth of a
doctrine, nor the wisdom of a decision, nor the justice of a verdict." Id at 23.
10. See id.
11. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 83.
12. Id.
13. FERRERO, supra note 7, at 205.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 197-201. For example, the prohibition of anti-government activities is men-
tioned four times in the Cuban Constitution and three times in the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China. CUBAN CONST. arts. 32, 54, 61, 64; P.R.C. CONST. arts. 1, 28, 54, trans-
lated in RALPH H. FOLSOM & JOHN H. MINAN, LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
COMMENTARY, READINGS, AND MATERIALS app. A (1989).
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In order to lessen these destablizing effects, a revolutionary re-
gime may attempt to inject its leadership with charisma. 16 In this
way, the population is often blinded by admiration for its leader and
will overlook the government's evils.' 7 Charismatic regimes, how-
ever, are temporary and unstable by nature' s because the leader will
eventually lose his charisma and be abandoned by his followers. 19
Thus, a revolutionary regime must find some other way to attain legit-
imacy and maintain stability.
Revolutionary governments acquire stability through the process
of institutionalization.20 Machiavelli recognized that stability is "con-
ferred on a [regime] by . . . virtue of an institution," and suggested
that "the institutions which caused the Roman republic to [remain
stable] were the introduction of plebeian tribunes.., and of all the
other laws which put a check on human ambition and arrogance." 21
In creating new institutions, however, a regime must at least retain
the shadow of its former laws and customs, so that the institutions do
not appear to have changed. 22 This is because institutions represent
stabilized patterns of behavior and shared expectations. Little else fa-
cilitates the establishment of new institutions more than their con-
gruity with established ways of thinking and acting. 23
The process of creating state institutions out of a revolution in-
volves numerous considerations. At a minimum, a new government
requires a military force, a decision-making body, and an infrastruc-
ture. However, no state institution is more important than the legal
system.24 Law is regarded as the lifeblood of government because
16. See Weber, supra note 3, at 1114-15.
17. Despite the murder of 6 million Jews, Adolf Hitler was still beloved by his people.
See generally J.P. STERN, HITLER: THE FUHRER AND THE PEOPLE (1975). Likewise, the
murder of 20 million Soviet citizens did not dampen Joseph Stalin's cult-like following. See
generally ADAM B. ULAM, STALIN: THE MAN AND His ERA (1989).
18. See generally Weber, supra note 3, at 1113.
19. Id. at 1114.
20. Valdis, supra note 1, at 8-13.
21. NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE DiscouRsEs 387 (Bernard Crick ed., Penguin Classics
1987) (circa 1519).
22. Id. at 175. It should be noted that Machiavelli would strongly disagree with the
iconoclastic character of the Cuban and Chinese revolutions. Regarding the course new re-
gimes should take in establishing their power he wrote that "[i]f the ruler wants to keep hold of
his new possessions, he must ... change neither their laws nor their taxes. In this way, in a
very short space of time the new [regime] will be rolled into one with the old." NICCOL6
MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 36 (George Bull trans., Penguin Classics 1986) (circa 1516).
23. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 217.
24. See Richard Thornburgh, The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law, FOREIGN AFF.,
Spring 1990, at 13.
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"[i]t shapes social and economic structures and relationships, and
provides normative rules for private and public conduct. ' 25 Thus,
without a stable legal system, the revolutionary regime will never at-
tain the status of a legitimate government, and will survive only so
long as the revolutionary leaders have the energy to subjugate their
people.
This Comment will examine and compare the judicial institution-
alization of the revolutions in the People's Republic of China ("PRC"
or "China") under Mao Zedong, and the Republic of Cuba ("Cuba")
under Fidel Castro Ruz. First, it will document the routes the revolu-
tionary governments of China and Cuba followed when they at-
tempted to establish a legal system. Second, it will compare and
examine the internal dynamics of the adopted legal systems. Third, it
will explain how the legal systems of China and Cuba contributed to
the communist regimes' survival in light of the global collapse of com-
munism.26 Although there are several factors that determine a re-
gime's ultimate stability or downfall, such as the militia, culture,
ecclesiastic principles, and the political and economic climate, this
Comment focuses exclusively on the role of the law and judicial insti-
tutions in China and Cuba.
Before embarking on a study of the Chinese and Cuban legal sys-
tems one should consider Professor Dolores Donovan's caution:
Members of the American legal profession share with the rest of
the human race a tendency to generalize from their own experi-
ence. This tendency results in the expectation... that the formal
... legal system[s] [of other societies] will be similar to the system
that exists in the United States. This expectation is unfounded.27
Thus, in examining the Chinese and Cuban judicial institutionaliza-
tion, one must bear in mind that these laws are the product of differ-
ent legal traditions, and may not always comport with the American
concept of justice.
25. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of law in society, see Robert W. Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See also Alejandro Serrano Caldera, The
Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 341 (1990).
26. See generally PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Jan.-Apr. 1992.
27. Dolores A. Donovan, The Structure of the Chinese Criminal Justice System: A Com-
parative Perspective, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 229 (1987).
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II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POST-REVOLUTIONARY LEGAL
SYSTEM
A. The People's Republic of China
1. Revolutionary Developments (1949-1954)
Following the successful overthrow of the Guomindang govern-
ment in 1949,28 the revolutionary regime of Mao Zedong established
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference ("Confer-
ence"), and adopted a new legal system on September 29.29 The Con-
ference issued two documents: (1) the Common Program, which
abolished all the laws and legal institutions of the former government
and declared that all new laws would be established by the new Com-
munist regime;30 and (2) the Organic Law, which gave the new regime
the authority to establish a new judicial system.31 During this early
period, the Communist regime enacted 148 laws and regulations gov-
erning areas such as trade unions, land reform, corruption, marriage,
and counterrevolutionary activity.3 2 The Common Program and the
Organic Law established a provisional system of government while
allowing the Conference to continue laying a foundation for a more
permanent system.
33
At first, because of the insufficient number of qualified Commu-
nist officials to fill the positions, the Communist regime allowed
Guomindang judges, prosecutors, and other legal technicians to re-
main in office. 34 However, in an effort to hasten the conversion to
communism, the Legal Reform Campaign of 1952 removed or con-
demned all remaining jurists from the former government and re-
placed them with communist officials who were poorly trained, but
ideologically correct.35
The Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") viewed both the law
28. The Guomindang government, or Nationalists, headed by Chaing Kai-shek, had been
in power since October 10, 1912, when it overthrew the Qing Dynasty. Its notorious corrup-
tion caused it to lose the support of the people and facilitated the communist revolution in
1949. See generally JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION: 1800-1985
(1986).
29. Craig B. Simonsen, Development and Organization of the Governmental and Legal
Systems of the People's Republic of China, 6 CHINA L. REP. 239, 243 (1991).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Tao-tai Hsia & Wendy I. Zeldin, Recent Legal Developments in the People's Republic
of China, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, 251 (1987).
33. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 243.
34. Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 32, at 252.
35. Id.
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and legal institutions as tools to support the Party and state power.36
Mao Zedong believed that his regime should reflect a continuous
revolution, and opposed a legal system which would restrain it.
37
Thus, new Chinese law consisted of general principles and shifting
policies, rather than detailed and constant rules.
38
2. Initial Legal Reforms (1954-1957)
On September 21, 1954, the National People's Congress
("NPC") adopted the Constitution of the PRC.39 The 1954 Constitu-
tion was actually little more than the Soviet legal code translated into
Chinese and rewritten to suit Chinese conditions. 40 However, this
Constitution was a genuine attempt at institutionalization by the Mao
regime.4
1
On September 28, 1954, the PRC supplemented the Constitution
with the addition of the Organic Laws of the People's Courts and the
People's Procuracies, providing the Chinese judicial system with a
permanent structure.4 2 The judicial system was organized into four
descending levels. Unlike the dual state and federal court systems
found in the United States, the court system in China was established
as a single national system.43 The highest level of the judiciary was
the Supreme People's Court, followed by the Higher People's Courts,
the Intermediate People's Courts, and the Basic Level People's
Courts." The People's Courts were established to administer justice,
while the People's Procuratorates were assigned to enforce the laws.45
During this phase of Chinese legal development, academic re-
search flourished.46 Several law books were written, and two major
law journals were published.47 Additionally, the government began to
draft a civil and criminal code.48 This period has been referred to as
36. U.S. GOVERNMENT, FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CHINA: A
COUNTRY STUDY 509 (1988) [hereinafter CHINA STUDY].
37. Id at 510.
38. Id. at 509.
39. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 243.
40. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 512.
41. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 13 (1985).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 245-46.
44. Id. at 246.
45. LENG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 14.
46. Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 32, at 252.
47. Id
48. Id
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the "golden age of legal development" in China. 49
3. Setbacks in the Legal System (1957-1976)
a. Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-1965)
China's progress toward a stable legal system came to an abrupt
halt in the fall of 1957. 50 It began in 1956 when Mao encouraged
people to vent their criticisms of his government saying, "Let one
hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought con-
tend,"'51 echoing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor. 52 However, the Mao government was unprepared
for the thorough lashing it received as a result of the movement's
open policy. During the Hundred Flowers Movement, intellectuals
vociferously criticized the political leadership for being too slow in
enacting laws, and for holding themselves above the law.5 3 Members
of the legal profession criticized the lack of judicial independence and
equality before the law, and also criticized the "crime by analogy"
doctrine, which allowed a person to be convicted for a non-criminal
act as long as the court found the act similar to a criminal act. 54
Rather than accepting the criticism as constructive, Mao labeled
his critics class enemies and launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 55
He purged the judiciary of liberal jurists, replacing them with party
cadres, closed law schools and legal research institutes, and required
most civil disputes to be resolved by informal, non-judicial mediation
committees.5 6 Additionally, the Ministry of Justice was eliminated,
and attempts to codify a civil and criminal law were halted.57 China's
formal legal system continued to experience a steady decline in impor-
tance, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign put an end to efforts that
would have brought about judicial independence. 58
b. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
The Cultural Revolution was initiated by Mao, with the help of
49. Id
50. LENG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 16.
51. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 513-14.
52. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 514.
54. Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 32, at 252.
55. Id at 252-53.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. LENG & CHIu, supra note 41, at 16-17.
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his wife, Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, and others, in order to impose Maoist
values and norms on both the population and governmental institu-
tions.59 Mao feared that "enemies of the people" had infiltrated the
government institutions, and hoped to revive socialist ideology in the
country.6° This revival was to be accomplished, in part, by mobilizing
college and secondary students, called the Red Guards.6' The Red
Guards dropped out of school and spent their days sabotaging state
institutions and persecuting school and government officials suspected
of being counter-revolutionaries. 62 In the process of this struggle, all
progress made toward judicial institutionalization was nullified.63
It was during this time that Mao began to develop a cult-like
following." The "cult of personality" that surrounded Mao made
him a virtual deity in China; his word was law. Throughout the Cul-
tural Revolution, "[tihere was no rule of law and no judicial system to
mention; although, on paper, they continued to exist. The Mao line
was in power."' 65 During this period, Mao said, "Depend on the rule
of man, not the rule of law." The era was further characterized by
kangaroo courts which convicted many citizens of political, rather
than legal, transgressions, and led to the complete breakdown of a
formal legal system.67
Between 1966 and 1976, very few laws were enacted, and the
publication of law books and journals nearly ceased.6S Furthermore,
the law and legal institutions were dismembered in a frenzy of hys-
terical fanaticism. Beginning in 1966, all law schools were closed.
Attorneys, judges, courtroom personnel and law teachers were
forced to work in the countryside .... The Red Guards... freely
searched houses without legal process, arrested anyone, investi-
59. Id at 17.
60. See RuTH CHERRINGTON, CHINA'S STUDENTS: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY
41 (1991). See also Simonsen, supra note 29, at 252.
61. FOLSoM & MINAN, supra note 15, at 11.
62. Id
63. Id at 12.
64. Under Lin Biao's direction, "[statues, busts, and portraits of... [Mao] ... were
scattered and plastered over the length and breadth of China, while all the media poured out
an unceasing paean of praise and worship." WITOLD RODZINSKI, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA: A CONCISE POLITICAL HISTORY 97 (1989). His writings were compiled in a "lit-
tle red book" entitled Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, which was widely read. Id
65. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 253.
66. LENG & Cslu, supra note 41, at 18.
67. See Chin Kim & Michael M. Tsai, Some Legal Problems Concerning Political Crime
Under the Chinese Socialist Legal System, 17 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 179 (1989).
68. Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 32, at 253.
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gated anything, and sentenced, imprisoned, and frequently
executed.
69
The Red Guards were unrestrained by procedure, and often re-
sorted to torture and rape to achieve their political ends. 70 High level
Chinese Communist Party leaders (later referred to as the "Gang of
Four" 71) openly praised the Red Guards for breaking the law, and
urged them to "smash the police organs, procuracies, and courts. '72
Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution did not accomplish Mao's
goals. 73 Rather, it left an entire generation of young people disillu-
sioned by their country's leadership. 74 The experiences of the Cul-
tural Revolution caused former Red Guards, as well as their victims,
to question CCP leadership and desire an organized legal system. 75
4. Post-Mao Legal Reforms: Socialist Legality (1976-1989)
Following the January 1976 death of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai,
a power struggle ensued between the Gang of Four and a group of
reform-minded party leaders headed by Deng Xiaoping. 76 Neither
side was able to secure the appointment of their candidate as Prime
Minister.77 Instead, a compromise candidate, Hua Guofeng, an ob-
scure party official from Mao's province, was appointed. 78
On April 5, 1976, the day of the annual Qingming festival, where
the Chinese pay tribute to their ancestors at Tian An Men Square, a
spontaneous tribute to Zhou Enlai erupted. 79 This tribute mocked the
Gang of Four and praised Deng Xiaoping. 80 Angered, the Gang of
Four convinced Mao, debilitated by Parkinson's disease, to expel
Deng Xiaoping from his position as First Vice-Chairman of the
PCC.8 ' Deng, second in power only to Mao, was now replaced by
69. FoLsoM & MINAN, supra note 15, at 12.
70. Id
71. The Gang of Four was composed of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao
Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao. RODZINSKI, supra note 64, at 202.
72. Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 32, at 253-54.
73. FoLsoM & MINAN, supra note 15, at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO 50
(1987).
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Id at 51.
80. Id.
81. Id.
1992]
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Hua.8 2 Following Mao's death on September 9, 1976, the Gang of
Four produced a document, purportedly written by Mao, calling on
the people of China to follow the Gang of Four and the principles
espoused during the Cultural Revolution. 3 Further, they attempted
to appoint Jiang Qing, Mao's widow and leader of the Gang of Four,
as Mao's successor as Chairman of the Party.84 Sensing an imminent
coup, moderates in the Politburo launched a "preemptive strike"
against the Gang of Four.8 5 The Gang of Four was arrested for forg-
ing the document of Mao's last wishes, and then accused of motivat-
ing the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. 86
Hua Guofeng remained in power throughout this turmoil. In
1977, he ordered the creation of a new Constitution that incorporated
many of the 1954 Constitution's legal institutions.8 7 The new Consti-
tution codified the criminal and civil law and reopened law schools. 8
Although Mao had frustrated previous efforts to adopt a legal code,89
his name was frequently invoked as authority for codifying the legal
system, rebuffing those who viewed the process as counter-revolution-
ary.90 Despite Hua Guofeng's victory over the Gang of Four, he was
undistinguished as the Party head. In late autumn 1978, Deng Xiaop-
ing, who had regained his prestige in the Party, replaced Hua.91
Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, substantial legal reforms
were made in an attempt to strengthen and formalize China's legal
system.92 There were several reasons for the reforms. First, many
members of the post-Mao leadership, including Deng, had been vic-
timized by the lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution. 93 Second, to
encourage the population's enthusiastic participation in the process of
82. Id. at 51-52.
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id. at 52.
86. Id
87. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 516.
88. Id. at 517.
89. See Andrew Mayer, The Rocky Road to Democracy: A Few Comments on Legal De-
velopment in China Since the Cultural Revolution, 6 CHINA L. REp. 1 (1989).
90. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 518.
91. RODZINSKI, supra note 64, at 226.
92. Id.
93. LENG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 36. After a period of house arrest, Deng Xiaoping
was exiled to Jiangxi province between 1969 and 1973. RODZINSKI, supra note 64, at 174, 190.
During the Cultural Revolution, Deng's eldest son, Pufang, a physics student, was thrown
from a third floor window by the Red Guards and, as a result, was permanently paralyzed. Id.
at 128.
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modernizing China, 94 a stable legal system was needed to help over-
come the atmosphere of fear and insecurity.95 Third, after the Cul-
tural Revolution, China needed a reliable legal order to maintain the
stable environment required for economic growth96 and foreign
investment. 97
The most recent Constitution was completed on December 4,
1982.98 The numerous laws enacted since the promulgation of the
1978 Constitution made a new constitution necessary. 99 The Consti-
tution contains twenty-four articles pertaining to individual rights and
duties. 100 Among these rights are guarantees that citizens will be free
from unlawful searches, 10 illegal or secret arrests, 0 2 and "[i]nsult,
libel, false charge or frame-up." 10 3
Further, the Constitution guarantees that citizens' homes and
correspondence will not be searched, except in cases where public se-
curity is at risk.1°4 The most significant provision in the 1982 Consti-
tution is directed at the Party and government leadership and states
that "[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being
above the Constitution and the law."105 Additionally, the new Con-
stitution limits members of the National People's Congress ("NPC")
to a five-year term. 06 The President of the Supreme People's Court10 7
94. Id. at 36. This was promoted through a program known as the "Four Moderniza-
tions," which was designed to modernize China's industry, military, science and technology,
and agriculture.
95. See id
96. LENG & CHIu, supra note 41, at 36.
97. Mayer, supra note 89, at 2.
98. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 259.
99. These laws include the Act on Arrest and Detention (1979), Environmental Protec-
tion Law (1979), Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Govern-
ments (1979), Organic Laws of the People's Courts (1979), Organic Law on the People's
Procuratorates (1979), Electoral Law (1979), Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law
(1979), Forestry Law (1979), Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment
(1979), Marriage Law (1980), Nationality Law (1980), Joint Venture Income Tax Law (1980),
Individual Income Tax Law (1980), the Act on Academic Degrees (1980), and the Provisional
Act on Lawyers (1980). FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 61, at 15. See also LENG & CHIU,
supra note 41, at 45.
100. P.R.C. Co0sr., translated in FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15, app. A.
101. Id. art. 37.
102. Id
103. Id art. 38.
104. Id. arts. 39, 40.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. Id art. 60.
107. Id. art. 124.
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and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate 0 8
are each limited to two consecutive five-year terms.
At the time of its completion, it was uncertain whether the 1982
Constitution would be followed, or whether it would even provide a
standard by which all citizens and organizations would abide.1°9 On
its face, it provides that all "state organs, the armed forces, all polit-
ical parties and public organizations... must abide by the Constitu-
tion and the law."11o However, the effect of this provision ultimately
turns on which government organ interprets and enforces the Consti-
tution. Article 67 empowers the Standing Committee of the NPC to
interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement."' Article
67, however, also empowers the Standing Committee to enact and an-
nul the law." 2 It further gives the Standing Committee the power to
appoint and remove the judges of the Supreme People's Court and
members of the Supreme People's Procuratorate." 3
However, since the NPC has the power to amend the Constitu-
tion, it is not likely that it will find any of the laws it enacts unconsti-
tutional.1 4 Therefore, while it is true that the Supreme People's
Court is not subject to interference from the NPC," 5 the Court can-
not hold a law or statute unconstitutional because it has no authority
to do so." 6 The function of the Supreme People's Court is thus to
adjudicate whether a written law has been violated, not whether that
law violates the Constitution." 7
Despite its flaws, the 1982 Constitution signifies a move toward
pragmatism and legal stability through the promotion of the jural
model of law.'II It has proved to be a strong document and, prior to
the demonstrations in Tian An Men Square in May 1989, it had not
undergone major changes." 9
108. Id art. 130.
109. See Owen M. Fiss, Two Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492, 502 (1986).
110. P.R.C. CONST. art. 5, translated in FOLSON & MINAN, supra note 15, app. A.
111. Id. art. 67, § 1.
112. Id. art. 67, §§ 2, 7.
113. Id art. 67, §§ 11, 12.
114. Id. art. 62, § 1.
115. Id. art. 126.
116. See LENG & CHIu, supra note 41, at 63.
117. Id.
118. Id at 44. Jural law is law that is considered necessary to govern, and is generally
devoid of moralistic judgments. Id.
119. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 521.
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5. Tian An Men Square and its Aftermath (1989-Present)
The crushing of the pro-democracy movement in June 1989 at
Tian An Men Square was a major setback to the establishment of a
formal legal system. 120 Although the NPC has continued to enact
laws and regulations, 121 there has been increased political influence
over the judiciary, 122 and thus many of these laws are aimed at curb-
ing individual liberties.123 Further, in prosecuting pro-democracy
demonstrators, the government has failed to abide by the provisions
contained in the 1979 Criminal Procedure Code.1 24
Four months after the demonstrations, the NPC passed the Law
Governing Assemblies, Parades, and Demonstrations. 25 This law re-
quires those seeking to hold a demonstration to apply for a permit
from the local governing body at least five days before the scheduled
event. 126 Within two days, the local government must either deny or
allow the demonstration to take place, depending on whether the
gathering promotes government-held ideals. 27 An appeal may be
made to the same body if a permit is denied. 128 Those who participate
in the demonstration may not be employed by the state, and must live
in the city where the demonstration will take place. 129 Theoretically,
this prevents agitators from coming to a city to stir up protest, and
ensures that the demonstration does not reach the size of the Tian An
Men Square protest. 30 A violation of this law can result in a five-year
prison sentence.' 3 ' If a foreigner wishes to participate in the demon-
stration, permission must be obtained from the local governing
body. 132 This requirement typifies the government's unfounded belief
that "the pro-democracy movement was fuelled [sic] in part by the
120. Simonsen, supra note 29, at 258.
121. Margaret Y. K. Woo, Legal Reforms in the Aftermath of Tiananmen Square, 17 REV.
SOCIAUST L. 51, 52 (1991).
122. Id at 69-70.
123. Id at 53.
124. Id at 51. This has resulted in "arbitrary arrests, warrantless arrests and searches,
secret trials, and the imposition of administrative rather than criminal sanctions." Id.
125. Id at 62. The text of the law may be found in The PRC Law Governing Assemblies,
Parades, and Demonstrations, RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily), Nov. 1, 1989, at 2.
126. Woo, supra note 121, at 62.
127. Id.
128. Id. However, "the final decision on appeal does not need to come down until a day
after the event is scheduled." Id.
129. Id. at 63.
130. Id.
131. Id at 64.
132. Id at 63.
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participation and encouragement of foreigners in the country.' 33
Since the June massacre, the government has declared an "anti-
crime campaign" designed to arrest persons who oppose the govern-
ment, and silence critics through fear.' 34 It requires the police to be
more aggressive in finding criminals, and the courts to be harsher in
sentencing. 3 5 This campaign has resulted in 6,129 arrests, 5,650 "re-
educations" at labor camps, and 568,000 administrative sanctions. 3 6
Perhaps the most detrimental effect the massacre had on the
legal system is that the government has turned away from its efforts
toward judicial independence. 3 7 The NPC has enacted laws which
have increased political influence in the courts 3 8 and reestablished
CCP superiority over the law.' 39 Further, "Chinese leaders have also
begun to talk about law as a counter-balance to democracy."'
4
The events of June 1989 have undoubtedly hurt the legal reforms
made between 1976 and 1988. It is a sad development in the personal
history of Deng Xiaoping,' 4' especially considering the progress that
had been made in legal reforms. Although some scholars believe the
current hard line will be reversed, 42 it is unlikely to happen in the
near future. 43 Although this new era cannot be compared with the
lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution, the laws that have been en-
acted are more restrictive than previous laws. 144
133. Id. Blaming the unrest at Tian An Men Square on foreigners suggests that the gov-
ernment implicitly maintains that such a movement would not have been instigated by its own
citizens. This implication presumes that the Chinese people are satisfied with the status quo,
and that the current government is the free and sincere expression of their wishes. See supra
text accompanying note 13.
134. Id. at 65.
135. Id.
136. Woo, supra note 121, at 66 n.73.
137. Id. at 67-68.
138. Id. at 69.
139. Id. at 72.
140. Id. at 71.
141. Professor Richard Baum of the University of California at Los Angeles notes,
What is so tragically ironic.., is that now it is Deng Xiaoping himself who is playing
the role of autocrat antihero previously performed by the Gang of Four ... Deng has
instinctively opted to clamp down on the perceived sources of dissent and disorder-
China's liberal intelligentsia. Like countless Chinese emperors before him, Deng has
opted for order over equity, obedience over authenticity.
Richard Baum, Deng Didn't Learn Lesson: Takes Wrong Tack in Attacking Messengers, Not
the Problem, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1989, pt. II, at 7.
142. Mayer, supra note 89, at 1.
143. Baum, supra note 141, at 7.
144. See Woo, supra note 121, at 73.
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B. The Republic of Cuba
1. Revolutionary Developments (1959-1969)
On January 1, 1959, the Communist revolution led by Fidel Cas-
tro triumphed, and seven years of brutal dictatorship by Fulgencio
Batista came to an end.145 The ease with which Batista's regime was
overthrown has been attributed to its "political illegitimacy, disre-
spect for the people's legitimate expectations, and indiscriminate use
of repression against political dissidents."' 14 6 Ironically, Castro had to
overcome these same problems when institutionalizing his revolution.
The fall of the Batista government left Cuba without any estab-
lished leadership. 147 Since the new Cuban regime was created by a
violent revolution, there was no transitional government, and nothing
was left of the old regime. 14 Cuba's political structure during this
period was characterized as an institutional vacuum. 149 John Dunn
observed of the era:
[No Cubans had much idea of the character of Castro's revolu-
tionary projects in December of 1958. He could hardly be said to
have had much idea of its character himself in any detail at that
point, except insofar as it was simply to create a very different or-
der from that which currently existed. 150
The Castro regime eliminated the former military, political par-
ties, and labor unions, and replaced them with new bodies such as the
Rebel Army, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and
other revolutionary groups.15 1 The figurehead of each of these groups
was Fidel Castro, whose oratory skills and charisma were used to jus-
tify all government action. 152
145. Vald~s, supra note 1, at 1.
146. U.S. GOVERNMENT, FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CUBA: A
COUNTRY STUDY, 38 (4th ed. 1st prtg. 1988) [hereinafter CUBAN STUDY].
147. Vald~s, supra note 1, at 1.
148. Id at 2. Fidel Castro remarked, "On January 1, with the military downfall of the
Batista regime, nothing was left. There was no legislative power in the classic sense, no judi-
cial power, nothing. Then we established a de facto revolutionary government and in that
context laws were established by decree." Id.
149. Vald~s, supra note 1, at 3.
150. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting JOHN DUNN, MODERN REVOLUTIONS 236
(1972)).
151. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 39.
152. Id. at 42.
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a. The Fundamental Law of 1959
Throughout the revolution against the Batista regime, Castro
proclaimed that one of the goals was to restore the Constitution of
1940 which had been suspended by Batista.'" a Rather than restore
the 1940 Constitution, however, Castro introduced the Fundamental
Law of 1959 ("Fundamental Law").' 5 4 Despite the government's
claims, the Fundamental Law was not a revision of the 1940
Constitution. 155
Although similar to the 1940 Constitution in social and eco-
nomic matters,' 56 the Fundamental Law changed the government of
Cuba into a constitutional dictatorship. 57 It replaced the former
Chamber of Representatives and Senate with the president's cabinet,
the Council of Ministers.'5 8 Under the Fundamental Law, the presi-
dent's power was unrestricted.1 9 It allowed the president to appoint
and dismiss members of the Council of Ministers at will.'16 The
Council of Ministers was empowered to pass ordinary legislation by a
simple majority vote, and could amend the Fundamental Law by a
two-thirds majority vote.' 6' Thus, the president could order the
Council of Ministers to enact any legislation he desired, because he
could dismiss ministers who would not obey and replace them with
those who would.' 62 Fidel Castro was not reluctant to use this power,
and between 1959 and 1963, the Fundamental Law was amended
nineteen times. 63
Ironically, in his 1953 speech, "History Will Absolve Me," Cas-
tro criticized an identical provision in Batista's Constitutional Act of
1952.164 At that time, Castro said that since constitutional amend-
ments "can be brought about by a vote of two-thirds of the Cabinet
and the Cabinet is named by the President, then the right to make and
break Cuba is in the hands of one man .... Such a power recognizes
153. William D'Zurilla, Comment, Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and Fidelista Inter-
pretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TUL. L. REv. 1223, 1239 (1981).
154. Id.
155. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 161.
156. Id.
157. D'Zurilla, supra note 153, at 1239.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id
161. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 161.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. D'Zurilla, supra note 153, at 1240.
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no limits.' 65 Castro's supporters defend this duplicity, contending
that "Batista assumed absolute power in order to loot the country,
while Castro did so out of necessity, to carry out the mandate of the
people to institute the revolutionary program."' 66
b. The Revolutionary Courts
The Revolutionary Tribunals, established for those who commit-
ted crimes against the state, played a major role in the early years of
the Castro regime.167 The tribunals are reported to have sentenced
thousands of Cubans for counter-revolutionary activity.1 68 The most
noted case before the Revolutionary Tribunals was the February 1959
trial of forty-five members of Batista's air force. 69 The defendants
were acquitted of genocide charges stemming from Batista's resist-
ance to the revolution. 70 However, Castro was displeased with the
verdict and ordered that they be tried a second time.' 7' Despite pro-
tests from the legal community, this time the defendants were con-
victed and executed. 72 In effect, two legal systems appeared: one for
ordinary civil and criminal cases, and another for politically sensitive
cases. 73 By 1974, the Revolutionary Tribunals had been formally
abandoned. 74 However, as of 1979, many prisoners convicted by the
Revolutionary Tribunals were still in custody. 75
c. The Popular Tribunals
One of the most significant innovations in the judiciary was the
creation of the popular tribunals.1 76 First established in 1963, the
number of popular tribunals reached 2,121 by the end of the decade,
and they were staffed by nearly 8,000 judges. 7 7 However, their juris-
diction was ill-defined, and thus they not only attempted to resolve
criminal and civil cases, but also personal quarrels and family dis-
165. Id.
166. Id
167. See Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 477.
168. Id
169. Salas, supra note 2, at 45.
170. Id.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. Luis Salas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 587, 597 (1983).
174. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 478.
175. Id. at 477 n.6.
176. Luis SALAS, SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEVIANCE IN CUBA 211 (1979).
177. Id.
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putes. 17 The purpose of these courts, according to Fidel Castro, was
"to recognize and resolve these problems, not with sanctions, as in the
traditional style, but rather with measures that would have a
profound educational spirit."' 79
Consistent with this objective, judges were selected based on
moral fitness and revolutionary commitment, rather than legal abil-
ity.1 80 Because lawyers were regarded as remnants of capitalism,181 a
legal education acted as a barrier, rather than an asset, to serving on a
popular tribunal. 8 2 Judges had few legal codes to guide them and
were left to use their discretion. 8 3 Thus, the offender could be
charged with violating a socialist norm of conduct without being ac-
cused of violating any criminal law.' s4 Furthermore, judges fre-
quently inquired into the background of the accused to aid in
reaching decisions, and often based their judgments on their own ex-
periences with the accused.1
8 5
For example, in one case a woman accused another of stealing
her trousers.8 6 The accused claimed she purchased the trousers, and
showed her ration book which indicated their purchase in May of
1968.187 One judge on the panel interrupted the testimony, to say that
he worked in the clothing industry and the pants at issue were not
available at the time of the alleged incident. The judge then accused
the defendant of lying and forging her ration booklet. She was given a
public admonition and was sentenced to sixty days confinement.' 88
While this may be an example of how the system worked in pursuit of
the truth, the case was not over. The judge also pointed out that the
accused's daughter was not in school and ordered her to attend
school, despite the fact that she had never been charged with any for-
mal offense. 189
Ultimately, however, there were too many conflicts with the
178. Id
179. Salas, supra note 2, at 48.
180. Id at 49.
181. SALAS, supra note 176, at 212.
182. Salas, supra note 2, at 49.
183. Id
184. Id. at S0.
185. See Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1319
(1969).
186. Id. at 1319.
187. Id at 1320.
188. Id
189. Id
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traditional court system. The major complaints concerned jurisdic-
tional clashes, diversity of sanctions, lack of uniformity among the
courts, informality leading to incorrect notions of socialist legality,
insufficient institutional control over judicial functions in popular
tribunals, and incorrect use of lay judges.190 Criticism became so se-
vere that by August 1970, Castro declared that future decisions would
be based on pragmatic rather than ideological considerations, and
stated that "[w]e. .. need more jurists, better prepared and specializ-
ing in different branches of law." 191
2. The Limits of Charisma
Unlike a government based on legal power' 92 or traditional
power, 193 a government based on charisma such as Cuba's can only
survive if the leadership is in touch with the masses. 194 Throughout
the 1960s, Castro successfully governed by charisma because he had
overthrown Batista, humiliated the United States in the Bay of Pigs
invasion, and defied the Soviet Union by disregarding the Soviet
model of communism. 195 However, Castro's charismatic authority
could not be sustained. 196 In order to retain its power, the Cuban
leadership had to institutionalize the revolution, which required "the
transference of power from a charismatic authority . . . to a legal-
bureaucratic authority."1 97
However, the major contributing factor to the need for institu-
tionalization in Cuba was the failure of the ten-million-ton sugar har-
vest of 1970.198 Castro pledged to Cubans that the country would
harvest ten million tons (9.07 million metric tons) of sugar. Castro
regarded the harvest as the measure of his regime's success or fail-
190. SALAS, supra note 176, at 215.
191. Salas, supra note 2, at 51.
192. Legal power "presupposes the existence of a juridical order prior to the agent exercis-
ing authority, as well as a system of laws and regulations which are the foundation and the
norm of conduct that authority must follow." Valds, supra note 1, at 7.
193. Traditional power is based on "an authority pattern arising from a legitimacy that
supposedly always existed," such as a ruling monarchy. Id.
194. Id. at 10.
195. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 53.
196. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 2.
197. Vald6s, supra note 1, at 13. Vald6s notes that the process of institutionalization in-
volved much more than the mere creation of institutions. It involved the transference of au-
thority from a small nucleus of individuals to institutions, the creation of new, or the
restructuring of existing institutions, and the bureaucratization of authority. Id. at 14-18.
198. EDWARD GONZALEZ, CUBA UNDER CASTRO: THE LIMrrs OF CHARISMA 206
(1974).
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ure' 99 and believed that it could be achieved through the exclusive use
of moral, rather than economic, incentives.200
However, because of poor planning, incompetence, improvisation
in setting production quotas, and rampant absenteeism, the harvest
was doomed to fail. 20 1 Although Cuba produced a remarkable 8.5
tons of sugar that year,202 it had fallen short of Castro's goal. Cuba
paid a great price for the sugar harvest in terms of lost opportunities
to develop other crops20 3 and uses of labor.2°4 This economic failure
demonstrated that charismatic authority alone could not remedy the
economic malaise of the country.205 Castro acknowledged that "er-
rors had been committed, that zealousness and goodwill were no sub-
stitutes for competence, that ignorance and idealism were costly, and
that future expectations needed some rethinking. " 206 This new ap-
proach led to the "institutionalization of the revolution," an attempt
to create a more ordered, pragmatic, and predictable political
system.20 7
3. The Constitution of 1976: Socialism Institutionalized
Judicial institutionalization began in 1973 with Law 1250, which
reorganized the Cuban legal system.208 The revolutionary, military,
ordinary, and people's courts, previously under separate administra-
tion, were now united into a single body.2° 9 Additionally, Article 2
of Law 1250 established a four-tiered judicial system consisting of the
People's Supreme Court, the People's Provincial Courts, the People's
Regional Courts, and the People's Courts at the Base. 210 These courts
operated under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. 211
199. Castro said that even a harvest of 9,999,999 tons would constitute moral defeat.
AGUILA, supra note 6, at 102.
200. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 50. Castro's view was based on his adoption of
Sino-Guevarism, Cuban revolutionary leader Che Guevara's interpretation of the Chinese so-
cialist model. Id
201. Id at 51.
202. Id at 52.
203. Frontline: The Last Communist (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 11, 1992).
204. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 103.
205. Valds, supra note 1, at 21.
206. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 104.
207. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 2.
208. Max Azicri, Change & Institutionalization in the Revolutionary Process: The Cuban
Legal System in the 1970s, 6 REv. SOCIALIsT L. 164, 175 (1980).
209. Id. at 176.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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The next step in the institutionalization of the revolution was the
creation of a constitution. In 1975, the Commission on Juridical
Structures submitted a draft of the new Constitution to Castro, and
by 1976 it was ready for ratification. 212 On February 15, 1976, in a
national referendum, nearly 98% of the voters approved the new Cu-
ban Constitution.213 The Constitution consists of 12 chapters and 141
articles, and provides a comprehensive socialist framework for the
country.214
In 1977, the judicial system was again reorganized.21 5 The four-
tiered system was simplified to a three-tiered national hierarchy, con-
sisting of a single People's Supreme Court, fourteen People's Provin-
cial Courts, and 169 People's Municipal Courts.216 In contrast to
Law 1250 which defined the courts as subordinate to the "revolution-
ary socialist power," the people of Cuba were now officially recog-
nized as "the sovereign source of any power exercised by the
judiciary. ' 21 7 More significantly, however, a balance of powers was
created by giving the courts exclusive domain over the administration
of justice, while reserving control of the judiciary's administrative
functions to the Ministry of Justice.218
III. INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE ADOPTED LEGAL SYSTEMS
A. Judicial Independence
1. China
Chinese courts have never been independent from political over-
sight.219 From the time the Communists seized power in 1949 until
the adoption of the Constitution in 1954, government control of the
212. Leonel-Antonio de la Cuesta, The Cuban Socialist Constitution: Its Originality and
Role in Institutionalization, 6 CUBAN STUDIEs/EsTUD1OS CUBANOS 15 (1976). The Commis-
sion on Juridical Structures was created in 1965 for the purpose of drafting a new constitution.
Id.
213. CUBAN STUDY, supra note 146, at 162.
214. Chapter I addresses political, social and economic principles of the state; Chapter II,
citizenship; Chapter III, the family; Chapter IV, education and culture; Chapter V, equality;
Chapter VI, fundamental rights, duties, and guarantees; Chapters VII-X, government institu-
tions; Chapter XI, elections; Chapter XII, amending the Constitution. CUBAN CONST. ch. I-
XIl.
215. Azicri, supra note 208, at 176.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 176-77. The administration ofjustice involves matters such as sentencing con-
victed criminals, while the administrative functions of the judiciary include charging suspects
with crimes and providing legal counsel. Id at 175.
219. During the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1934) and the Yenan era (1935-1945),
19921
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judiciary continued in much the same manner it had for the previous
two decades. 220 The 1954 Constitution was unique because it pro-
vided that the "[p]eople's courts shall conduct adjudication indepen-
dently and shall be subject only to the law.
'221
The 1982 Constitution iterates this provision in Article 126, stat-
ing that the courts shall "exercise judicial power independently and
are not subject to interference by administrative organs. ' 222 How-
ever, the Supreme People's Court is made responsible to the NPC and
its Standing Committee, while the judges of the local people's courts
are responsible to the assemblies which elect them. 223 This structure
is similar to the Cuban court system, which holds judges accountable
to the organ which elected them.
2. Cuba
The Cuban judiciary is not an independent branch of government
that can check abuses of executive, legislative, or PCC authority.
Furthermore, the courts are not charged with protecting individual
rights and freedoms against the potential tyranny of government. Ar-
ticle 123 of the Constitution lists as the courts' main objectives "to
maintain and strengthen socialist legality" and to safeguard the eco-
nomic, social, and political regime established by the Constitution.
224
Thus, it is not surprising that Justices of the Supreme Court are
elected by the National Assembly. 225 The Justices are accountable to
the governmental body that elected them and are required to report,
and submit an account of their work to the National Assembly. 226
The Supreme Court is accountable to the Council of Ministers. 227
Additionally, since only the National Assembly can interpret the
Cuban Constitution, there is no judicial review of legislation. 228
Although the Constitution indicates that "judges... are independent
and owe obedience only to the law,"' 2 2 9 it also requires the courts to
judges were subordinate to the political authorities. Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Com-
munist Party and "Judicial Independence": 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REv. 967, 976 (1969).
220. Id
221. Id. at 979.
222. P.R.C. CONST. art. 126, translated in FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15, app. A.
223. Id art. 128.
224. CUBAN CONST. art. 123.
225. Id art. 128.
226. CUBAN STUDY, Supra note 146, at 170.
227. Id at 161.
228. Id. at 170.
229. CUBAN CONST. art. 125.
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"render an account of their work at least once a year to the Assembly
that elected them. ' 230 Further, it allows a judge to "be recalled... by
the organ which elected him."
23 '
The court system in Cuba consists of 169 municipal courts, four-
teen provincial courts (appellate courts), various military courts, and
quasi-judicial labor courts, with one supreme court overseeing the en-
tire system.232 This system replaced the Popular Courts of the 1960s
and 1970s which were often little more than public forums to vent
personal and political vendettas.233 Today, judicial selection is a two-
step process. First, the Ministry of Justice nominates candidates for
the Supreme Court and the lower courts.234 The President and Vice-
President of the Supreme Court are nominated by the Cuban Presi-
dent, Fidel Castro.235 Second, the National Assembly appoints the
Supreme Court justices,236 and the local assemblies elect their respec-
tive lower court justices. 237
B. Political Crime
1. China
The treatment of political crime in China is based on traditional
Chinese law, which is designed to protect the ruling class from its
subjects. 238 In fact, the Chinese government does not recognize indi-
vidual political rights as inalienable, but rather treats them as privi-
leges that may be regulated or eliminated entirely. 239 Therefore, those
who dissent from governmental policy often are labeled as counter-
revolutionaries. 240 These "traitors" are then prosecuted without legal
justification or procedural due process.241
Political privileges in China are class-oriented. 242 To enjoy them,
one must be a member of the favored classes, known collectively as
230. Id art. 128.
231. Id. art. 129.
232. See Azicri, supra note 208, at 176. See also AGUILA, supra note 6, at 173.
233. See SALAS, supra note 176, at 211-13.
234. Salas, supra note 2, at 54-55.
235. Id. at 55.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 54.
238. See Kim & Tsai, supra note 67, at 179.
239. Id. at 185-86.
240. Shao-Chuan Leng, Crime and Punishment in Post-Mao China, 2 CHINA L. REP. 5, 22
(1982).
241. Kim & Tsai, supra note 67, at 179.
242. Id at 186.
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"the people. ' 243 Those who are not members of the favored classes
are subject to a different standard of due process. Although Article
33 of the Constitution states that "[a]ll citizens of the People's Repub-
lic of China are equal before the law,"' 244 this does not apply to the
"five black elements," who are considered "enemies of the people." 245
In fact, during the Cultural Revolution, one of the CCP's leaders said
that "the concept of equality before the law, as a bourgeois concept,
has no place in the people's justice."' 246 This sentiment was felt so
strongly that Peng Chan, the Mayor of Beijing, was ousted during the
Cultural Revolution because he advocated the policy that "all people
must be equal before the law .... *"247
In China, the standard to determine whether a political crime
has been committed contains both a subjective and an objective ele-
ment. 248 Not only must the accused intend to overthrow the govern-
ment, but he or she must actually endanger or jeopardize the regime
or society.249 Because the Chinese legal tradition presumes guilt,
however, this standard is easily met. 25 0
Furthermore, the Chinese Criminal Code defines political crime
as "all acts which inflict harm on the People's Republic of China for
the purposes of overthrowing the regime of the proletarian dictator-
ship and the socialist system."' 25' A counter-revolutionary is defined
by the Code as one who "incites the masses to resist and sabotages the
enforcement of state law or decree," or "propagandizes and incites
others to overthrow the regime... by means of counter-revolutionary
slogans, leaflets, or other measures." 252 The Code also contains a
catch-all "analogy clause," which states that any "crime not specifi-
cally proscribed... may be confirmed... in light of the most analo-
gous article under the special provision of the present law; provided
that the case shall be submitted to the Supreme People's Court for its
approval." 253 Thus, even if the Code does not specifically prohibit a
243. Id
244. Id. at 180-81.
245. Id. at 181.
246. Kim & Tsai, supra note 67, at 181.
247. Id
248. Id. at 187.
249. Id
250. Id at 180.
251. P.R.C. CRIM. CODE art. 90.
252. Id art. 102.
253. Id art. 79. The analogy clause is not unique to the Communist regime. It existed in
the Tang (619-906), Ming (1368-1644), and the Qing (1644-1912) dynasties. Thus, Mao's re-
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given activity, if it is similar to a defined crime, the accused may be
convicted for that crime.
Leaders after Mao have attempted to rectify the past. In June
1978, the Chinese government released 111,000 people who were
wrongly convicted as "rightists" since 1958.254 In 1979, the govern-
ment restored political and civil rights to members of the "five black
elements." Finally, in 1980, the government released 175,000
counter-revolutionaries. 255 However, these releases were out of 1.13
million cases the courts reviewed.
256
Around the time of the student demonstrations at Tian An Men
Square, government efforts to curb political dissent were renewed be-
cause party leadership feared that continuing demonstrations would
lead to dire consequences. 257 When President Gorbachev of the So-
viet Union visited Beijing in mid-May 1989, student protesters could
be heard in the Great Hall of the People where he was meeting with
Deng Xiaoping.258 Embarrassed by the disruptions, the government
declared martial law on May 20, 1989,259 a condition imposed until
early 1990.26o On June 4, 1989, tanks and armed vehicles moved in to
clear the Square of protestors. 261 When it was over, approximately
3,000 people had been killed.262 In addition, hundreds of soldiers, in-
cluding one full colonel, reportedly were executed for refusing to
shoot at the unarmed demonstrators.263 On June 9, while addressing
the People's Liberation Army, Deng said, "If we had not suppressed
them, they would have brought about our collapse .... I myself, and
all of you commanding officers present, would have been shoved
under the guillotine. ' ' 264 Thus, while Deng acknowledged that the re-
gime appears to have followed Machiavelli's advice that new regimes not completely abandon
the laws of its predecessors. See generally Machiavelli, supra note 22.
254. Shao Chuan Leng, supra note 240, at 22.
255. Id. at 23.
256. Id
257. Ta-Ling Lee & John F. Copper, Failure of Democracy Movement: Human Rights in
the People's Republic of China 1988/89, 103 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN CONTEMP. ASIAN
STUD. 18 (1991).
258. Id. at 13.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 55.
261. Id at 13.
262. Lee & Copper, supra note 257, at 16-17. Immediately following the massacre, Chi-
nese officials claimed that close to 300 people had died. Two months later, the number was
lowered to 270; by February of 1990, Ambassador Li Luye maintained that "[t]he so-called
Tian An Men massacre is purely a fabrication." Id at 28.
263. Id at 16.
264. Us-or-Them Talk by Deng Reported, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1989, at A12.
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gime faced a genuine threat, he was unwilling to attribute it to a popu-
lar uprising, blaming it instead on international sabotage.265 The
demonstrators, however, openly called the regime a "pseudo-govern-
ment," arguing that the government had lost its legitimacy because it
lacked popular support.2 "6
In the days that followed the massacre, a "most-wanted" list cir-
culated throughout China, naming over twenty individuals who had
purportedly led the demonstration.267 Asia Watch, a New York-
based human rights organization, estimated that 30,000 people were
arrested following the massacre.268 Punishment included reeducation,
solitary confinement, torture, and execution.269
In an effort to avoid future problems with public demonstrations,
the CCP was purged of anyone with "rightist" tendencies; 270 the im-
portance of ideology was reaffirmed, and power was centralized. 27'
Subsequent changes in the legal system reflected the new emphasis on
these values.272 Prior to the crackdown, China was slowly moving
toward a system of law in order to facilitate the Four Modernizations.
Under martial law, it appeared to many observers that China was re-
verting to the lawlessness that pervaded during the Cultural
Revolution. 2
73
The 1989 crisis at Tian An Men Square marked the first time in
the history of the PRC that both the demonstrators and the govern-
ment invoked law to justify their positions.274 The students argued
that the declaration of martial law violated Article 29 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that the armed forces belong to the people.275
Furthermore, the quashing of the demonstration violated Article 35,
which guarantees the people's right to demonstrate.276 In turn, the
265. Lee & Copper, supra note 257, at 19.
266. Tao Dehai, China Democracy and Legal Crises, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 390, 397
(1990).
267. Lee & Copper, supra note 257, at 21.
268. Id at 25.
269. Id. at 25-26.
270. Id at 50. A "rightist" was anyone who had advocated a free market economy, capi-
talism, or democratic reform. Id at 51.
271. Lee & Copper, supra note 257, at 50.
272. Id at 50-51.
273. Id at 55.
274. Dehai, supra note 266, at 393.
275. Id. at 396; P.R.C. CONST. art. 29, translated in FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15,
app. A.
276. Dehai, supra note 266, at 394. Article 35 reads, "Citizens of the People's Republic of
China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
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government argued that because the demonstrators did not submit
written applications for permission to demonstrate in Beijing, the stu-
dents were in violation of the law.277 However, the fact that law was
the basis of the debate between the demonstrators and the government
provides hope that the PRC will turn toward a legitimate legal sys-
tem, and away from an ad hoe administration of justice according to
political necessity.
2. Cuba
Marxist socialists defend the Castro regime's treatment of polit-
ical dissent with two arguments. First, the regime's oppression is not
a permanent threat because of the communist theory that those hold-
ing power will not monopolize it indefinitely. 27 Second, even if some
freedoms are sacrificed, those freedoms are not as important as pro-
viding everyone with food, education, and employment.279 However,
as one scholar argues, "freedom of thought, conscience, and expres-
sion are consubstantial with humanness itself," and denial of these
rights constitutes an assault on the human spirit.280 Further, there is
no evidence that communist dictatorships relinquish their power once
a certain level of material comfort is achieved. 281 In fact, in times of
crisis, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, arrests for political
offenses increase.
28 2
In 1963, still fearful of threats to the regime, the government en-
acted Law 1098, part of an "anti-crime" campaign which reclassified
ordinary crimes such as burglary as political crimes. 28 3 By 1965, Cas-
tro claimed to hold 20,000 political prisoners. 28 4 Following the eco-
nomic crisis that resulted from the failure of the ten-million-ton sugar
harvest in 1970, the figure was estimated between 80,000 to 200,000
political prisoners. 285
demonstration." P.R.C. CONST. art. 35, translated in FoLsoM & MINAN, supra note 15, app.
A.
277. Dehai, supra note 266, at 393. The law the government referred to was the Provi-
sional Regulations Governing Demonstrations in Beijing Municipality, printed in BEUING
RIBAO (Beijing Daily), Dec. 27, 1986.
278. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 205.
279. Id. at 206.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 211.
283. SALAS, supra note 176, at 210.
284. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 211.
285. Id.
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Progress toward a legitimate legal system began in 1973 with the
general restructuring of the court system whereby the revolutionary
courts were absorbed into the ordinary court system.286 And in 1979,
Cuba adopted a new criminal code which reclassified common crimes
such as burglary, impersonation of public officials, and use of a minor
during a crime as non-political offenses. 287 These reforms decreased
the number of political prisoners in Cuba to between four and five
thousand. 288 During the 1980s, hundreds more political prisoners
were released.2
89
Although the Castro government claims it is willing to release
thousands more prisoners, 290 threats to Castro's regime, in light of the
global collapse of communism, are likely to cause an increase. These
threats include economic difficulties, as well as the possibility of a
coup or assassination.291 Even before the demise of the Soviet Union,
subsidies to Cuba had been steadily declining, from $4.1 billion in
1989, to $3.5 billion in 1990.292
In fact, Jorge Mas Canosa, chairman of the Cuban American
National Foundation, a powerful Washington lobbying group, trav-
eled to Moscow in December, 1991, to persuade Russian President
Yeltsin to cut off all aid to Cuba. 293 Given Russia's dismal economic
state, this seems likely. The economic situation in Cuba is currently
such that most citizens must line up each day to receive one loaf of
bread.294 The threat to Castro's regime is not just economic; some
predict that the angry mood on Cuban food lines will explode into
riots.295 Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez believes that the demise of Cas-
tro's regime "could happen tomorrow. ' 296 Others assert that it is
only a matter of time before the Castro regime crumbles. 297 However,
such expressions underestimate Castro's ability to overcome great ob-
286. SALAS, supra note 176, at 209-10.
287. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 209.
288. Id. at 211.
289. Id at 212. Despite these claims, Americas Watch estimates that Cuba continues to
hold between 10,000 to 15,000 political prisoners. MARY JANE CAMEJO, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CUBA: THE NEED TO SUSTAIN PRESSURE, AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT 4 (1989).
290. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 211.
291. Mike Clary, Cuba Entices Eager Entrepreneurs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at A5.
292. Paul Katel, One Man is an Island, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9, 1991, at 39.
293. Clary, supra note 291.
294. Katel, supra note 292.
295. Id.
296. Clary, supra note 291, at A5.
297. See Richard Boudreaux, Some Cracks Appear in Castro's Fortress Cuba, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1991, at Al.
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stacles, and are reminiscent of the CIA's underestimation of Castro's
popularity prior to the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion when the United
States believed that the invasion would spark a nation-wide revolt
against the regime.298 Fidel Castro is still very much in charge of
Cuba, and faithful in his commitment to socialism and anti-
Americanism.299
In January 1992, General Raul Castro, Fidel Castro's brother
and second in command,3 o threatened to reinstate the Revolutionary
Courts.30 1 This threat was issued after the arrest of 60 pro-democracy
activists in the few months following the unraveling of the Soviet
Union.30 2 Because Castro believes that recent waves of dissent are the
result of foreign interference, 30 3 dissidents were accused of conspiring
with the United States to overthrow the Castro regime.3°4
In January 1992, Cuba executed a Cuban exile who was con-
victed of planning a terrorist attack against Castro's regime.305 At
sentencing, the Council of State, headed by Fidel Castro, warned that
"revolutionary justice will show increasingly less clemency" toward
Castro's opposition. 306 Ricardo Bofill, President of the Cuban Com-
mittee for Human Rights, said that this statement "sends a clear
message to his internal opposition that whoever tries to take power
from Fidel Castro better be prepared to pay with his life."30 7
C. Rights of the Accused
1. China
The early years of the PRC were characterized by two comple-
298. AGUILA, supra note 6, at 63.
299. Clary, supra note 291, at A5.
300. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HAITI, PU-
ERTO RICO: COUNTRY REPORT 2 (1991).
301. Richard Boudreaux, Cuba Strikes Democracy Movement, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992,
at Al.
302. Id.
303. Id. In an open letter to Fidel Castro just before her arrest, the activist/poet Maria
Elena Cruz wrote, "No, Seflor Fidel Castro, the Cuban opposition isn't from or in the United
States, regardless of that country's questionable positions. Your opposition is yourself and
your own contradictions... the economic, political and social failure of 32 years of revolu-
tion." Boudreaux, supra note 301, at Al.
304. Id.
305. Cuban Firing Squad Executes Condemned Exile From Miami, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1992, at A8.
306. Richard Boudreaux, Castro Ignores Appeals for Clemency, Upholds Death Sentence
for Cuban Exile, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at A4.
307. Id.
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mentary models of law: jural and societal. 308 Jural law is what West-
ern jurists would call a rule of law, and includes the use of legal
institutions and procedure. 30 9 Legalists consider jural law essential to
running a government.310 In contrast, societal law is based on Con-
fucian principles which support the view that societal harmony can be
achieved through education and by following the example of virtuous
leaders. 311 Societal law relies on the use of uncodified moral law and
extrajudicial organs and procedures. 312 Generally, jural law is uti-
lized to deal with class enemies;31 3 societal law, "the people." Unlike
Cuba, China defines segments of its own population as enemies of the
people, relegates them to a condemned social status, and subjects
them to unequal treatment before the law. 314
Although the Confucian concept of model behavior was pre-
ferred over written law, traditional Chinese political rights and law
are influenced by both jural and societal models.315 Both models
agree that laws are designed to protect rulers, not citizens.316 In fact,
individual political rights are derived from the state, and are not
based on theories of natural law or inalienable human rights.317 As a
result, the rights that are conferred are not absolute and may be lim-
ited or withdrawn at the pleasure of the state. 318 The Criminal Proce-
dure Law of the People's Republic of China319 reflects this
philosophy.
The Criminal Procedure Law covers such areas as evidence, ju-
risdiction, search and seizure, expert witnesses, and interrogation of
the accused.320 Missing from the Criminal Procedure Law is the prin-
ciple of res judicata. 32' However, this has always been the case in
308. LENG & CHiu, supra note 41, at 11.
309. Id. at 10-11.
310. FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15, at 4.
311. Id. at 3-4.
312. LENG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 11.
313. Class enemies are counter-revolutionaries, landlords, rightists, rich peasants, and
other criminals. Kim & Tsai, supra note 67, at 181.
314. Kim, supra note 2, at 1420.
315. Kim & Tsai, supra note 67, at 185.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. CRIM. PRoc. LAW (P.R.C.), reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 120 (Foreign Languages Press 1987) [hereinafter P.R.C. CRIM. PROC. LAW]. The
Criminal Procedure Law was adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress on July 1, 1979, and became effective on January 1, 1980. Id.
320. Id pt. One, ch. II and IV, pt. Two, ch. II, §§ 1, 2, 4-6.
321. Kim, supra note 2, at 1441-42.
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Chinese legal history because of the notion that true justice may re-
main forever unsolved, and thus there should be no hard rules.322
Some of the more significant provisions in the Criminal Procedure
Law include: the right to an attorney, 323 the right to present a de-
fense, 324 prohibitions on torture,325 the requirement of a warrant to
make an arrest,326 automatic appeal when the death penalty has been
imposed, 327 and approval by the Supreme People's Court before a
convict is executed. 328
2. Cuba
In the early years of the regime, political necessity determined
the criminal laws.329 There was no concept of double jeopardy, no
right of habeas corpus, and laws were often enforced retroactively. 330
However, in 1979, when Cuba began institutionalizing the judiciary, a
new Penal Code was enacted. 331 Under the 1979 Code, theoretically,
no one could be punished for mere thoughts; however, the 1979 Code
criminalized circulating, reading aloud, writing, or possessing anti-so-
cialist propaganda. 332 The Penal Code was supplemented in 1987. 333
The new Penal Code mitigates the punishments of the old Code, and
offers more lenient sanctions, but preserves the death penalty for mur-
der, pedophilia, and political crime. 334 However, in areas other than
punishment, the 1987 Code remains essentially the same as the 1979
Code.335
Additionally, Cuba promulgated a new Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which established several principles, including the right to con-
front witnesses, the right to counsel, the right to a public trial, the
presumption of innocence, the right to prevent family members from
testifying against the accused, and the right against self-incrimina-
322. Id. at 1442.
323. P.R.C. CRIM. PROC. LAW pt. One, ch. IV, art. 26.
324. Id.
325. Id pt. One, ch. IV.
326. Id. pt. One, ch. VI, art. 50.
327. Id. pt. Two, ch. IV, art. 145.
328. P.R.C. CRIM. PROC. LAW pt. Two, ch. IV, art. 144.
329. Salas, supra note 2, at 60.
330. Id.
331. Michael Bogdan, Thirty Years of Cuban Revolutionary Law, 15 REv. SOCIALISr L.
319, 330 (1989). See also Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 476, 482.
332. Id. at 482-83. CUBAN PENAL CODE, art. 108.
333. Bogdan, supra note 331, at 330.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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tion.336 Appellate courts often reverse convictions which were ob-
tained in violation of the law.337 All laws are required to be
published, and one could not be convicted for violating an unpub-
lished law.338 Further, one accused of a crime can be detained in jail
during the preliminary investigation for a period of time equivalent to
the minimum sentence for the alleged crime. 339
The Code of Criminal Procedure also contains many exceptions,
particularly for those accused of crimes against the regime.340 In such
instances, the trial may be closed to the public and conducted without
the defendant present.34 Additionally, the criminal procedure laws
may be suspended in exceptional circumstances with the consent of
the President of the Supreme Court. 342
D. The Legal Profession
1. Legal Education
a. China
Although China did begin to institutionalize a Western-style
legal system for a brief period in the mid-1950s, the ideological ex-
cesses of Mao Zedong abruptly ended all progress. 343 Specifically, the
Anti-Rightist Movement effectively abolished the Chinese legal pro-
fession and law schools, and the Cultural Revolution destroyed the
remainder of the legal system. 344 After the death of Mao in 1976, and
the conviction of the Gang of Four in 1979, the legal system began to
revive.345 The revival is largely attributed to the rise of Deng Xiaop-
ing, who believed that a formal legal system is a prerequisite to a
highly developed economy. 346
In 1980, Chinese law schools were in a dismal state.347 Zhong-
336. SALAS, supra note 176, at 235.
337. Id at 236.
338. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 482.
339. Id.
340. SALAS, supra note 176, at 236.
341. Id See also CUBAN CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 305.
342. See SALAS, supra note 176, at 236; CUBAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 479.
343. John F. Murphy, Legal Education in China: Some Impressions, 1 CHINA L. REP. 50,
51 (1982).
344. Id. at 50.
345. See Id
346. Id at 50-51.
347. James C. Tuttle, Developments in China's Legal System: Introduction and Delegation
Overview, 2 CHINA L. REP. 36, 40 (1982).
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shan University Law Faculty had not acquired any new law books
since 1953.348 As of the fall of 1980, there were between eight and ten
law schools with an entering class of 1,250. 34 9 In 1982, there were
only sixteen law schools. 35
°
In order to practice law, one must complete four years of study
after secondary school. 35' This study includes ten weeks of practice
training in actual courtroom experiences.352 At Nanjing University,
students are required to take course work in philosophy, economics,
history of Chinese Communism, language, civil law, criminal law,
criminal procedure, marriage law, private and public law, and inter-
national law. 353 Constant throughout the entire legal curriculum is
a heavy ideological emphasis on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought. 35
4
Currently, the Ministries of Justice and Education are attempt-
ing to "organize uniform law teaching methods and materials" for all
Chinese law schools.355 In fact, in order to win a faculty appoint-
ment, professors must be approved by the Ministry of Justice.35 6 In
September 1986, the Ministry of Justice created the National Lawyers
Qualification Examination.35 7 Upon successful completion of the
exam, the examinee is issued a lawyer's certificate. 358 However, the
incentive to sit for the exam is weak, because with or without the
certificate, one may practice law. 359 Currently, the Ministry of Justice
is attempting to correlate passing the exam with increased salaries. 36°
Despite these recent reforms in legal education, however, most law-
yers in China still possess no legal education.361
348. Id. at 49.
349. Murphy, supra note 343, at 57.
350. Law schools have been established in Anhui University, Yunnan University, Nanjing
University, Shamen University, Wuhan University, and Zhongshan University. R. St. J. Mac-
donald, Legal Education in China Today, 6 DALHOUSIE L. J. 313, 314 (1980).
351. Tuttle, supra note 347, at 42.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Bing Ho, Chinese Legal Education: A First-hand Account by a Canadian Law Stu-
dent, 8 DALHOUSIE L. J. 32, 43 (1984).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Henry Pitney, The Role of Legal Practitioners in the People's Republic of China, 24
STAN. J. INT'L. L. 323, 358 (1988).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 359.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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b. Cuba
Following the 1959 Communist revolution, approximately 70%
of Cuban law graduates fled the country, and the two existing law
schools suspended classes when law professors left their posts. 362 Be-
tween 1964 and 1965, Cuba graduated no law students; and between
1965 and 1973, Cuban law schools graduated only 188 students. 363
Troubled by these figures, admissions standards were lowered, al-
lowing "good revolutionary comrades" to enter law school after pass-
ing a simple entrance exam.364 Coupled with poor teachers and
outdated textbooks, there was a serious deterioration in the quality of
legal education. 365
In the beginning of the 1980s, the Cuban Communist Party real-
ized that many of Cuba's problems could not be solved without the
creation of a more efficient legal system and, of course, better law
schools.366 The Cuban leadership admitted that lowering law school
admission standards was a mistake.367 The lack of prestige in the
legal profession was exemplified by the fact that in 1982 there were
only about 5,600 lawyers in a population of ten million.36 Today,
there are three law schools in Cuba, including the Faculty of Law at
the University of Havana where Fidel Castro graduated before the
revolution. 369 The Faculty of Law at the University of Havana now
has four departments: Basic Principles of Law, Civil and Family Law,
Criminal Law, and International Law. 370 In addition, Constitutional
Law is part of the curriculum.371 Cuban law professors are well paid,
and must have ten years of legal experience, fluency in at least two
languages, and legal publications to their credit.3 72 The government
still retains an element of control, however, by requiring law profes-
sors to be appointed by a special tribunal, to have mastered Marxism,
and to be supportive of the communist revolution. 37
3
362. Bogdan, supra note 331, at 321.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id
367. Id. at 312.
368. Id. at 322.
369. EDWARD GONZALEZ & DAVID RONFELDT, CASTRO, CUBA, AND THE WORLD 36
(1986).
370. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 483-85.
371. Id
372. Id
373. Id.
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2. Lawyers
a. China
Between 1959 and 1966, there were only four lawyers in
China.37 4 Today, there are two organizations for lawyers in China:
the Legal Advisers Offices and the Lawyers' Associations.375 The
Legal Advisers Offices are the work organs, and are funded by the
state.376 The Lawyers' Associations are the disciplinary bodies which
educate, reeducate, caution, and even disbar lawyers. 377
In 1982, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed the Provi-
sional Act on Lawyers. 378 Before this, there were only 1300 legal ad-
visory offices and 4800 attorneys in China. 379 In 1983, the number of
Legal Advisers Offices jumped to 2300, and the number of attorneys
increased to 12,500.380 By 1989, China had 30,000 lawyers in a popu-
lation of 1.1 billion.3
81
b. Cuba
Since the revolution, there have been serious conflicts between
the government and the legal profession. 38 2 By 1961, most of the law-
yers in Cuba had fled the island. 383 Because lawyers were associated
with the Batista regime, the Castro regime had always viewed the
legal profession with distrust.38 A Cuban law professor told a group
of visiting American law professors that when he was in law school,
he was embarrassed to tell people what he was studying.385 "Why in
the world do you want to become a lawyer?" his friends would ask.3 6
Private attorneys were tolerated for almost nine years until they
were forced into Lawyer's Collectives in 1974.387 The Lawyer's Col-
lectives, a national governmental law firm similar to the Legal Advis-
374. LFNG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 5 n.1.
375. Id. at 74.
376. Id. at 74-75.
377. Id.
378. CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 522.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Mayer, supra note 89, at 2. Compare this with one million lawyers in the United
States for a population one-fourth that of China. Id
382. Salas, supra note 2, at 66-69.
383. Id.
384. Id
385. Berman & Whiting, supra note 1, at 477.
386. Id
387. Bogdan, supra note 331, at 324.
1992]
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J[
ers Offices in China, were first established in 1965.388 They serve
150,000 paying clients and 500,000 non-paying clients every year.389
Attorneys in the Lawyer's Collectives are paid a fixed fee by the state
and are the best paid lawyers in Cuba, earning more than law profes-
sors, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 39° Their practice is
primarily criminal and family law.39 1 By 1980, there were over 500
full-time law students, and a National Union of Jurists comprised of
nearly 3000 members. 392
Despite these advancements, Cuban lawyers are not expected to
defend the interests of their client, as in the United States. 393 Rather,
they are required to determine the guilt or innocence of the client, and
if guilty, to seek sanctions which will best rehabilitate the client.394 In
other words, the attorney must subordinate the interests of the client
to those of the state.
395
3. The Attorney General's Office
a. China
In China, the Procuracy, or Attorney General's Office, is the
state organ for legal supervision, and is established in Section VII,
Article 129 of the Constitution.3 96 The duties of the Procuracy are
defined in Article 5 of the Organic law of the People's Procuracies
and include: the administration of criminal justice, investigation into
criminal behavior among both ordinary citizens and government offi-
cials, oversight of police activity, scrutinization of trial activities, and
supervision of prisons.397 Procurators are supposed to be independent
and not subject to interference by individuals or administrative or-
gans.398 However, at the same time, procurators are responsible to
the corresponding level of government.399 Although there is a con-
sensus that all the procurators are incorruptible, Party interference
388. Id.
389. Id. at 324-325.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Bogdan, supra note 331, at 322.
393. Camejo, supra note 289, at 72-73.
394. Salas, supra note 2, at 68.
395. Camejo, supra note 289, at 73.
396. P.R.C. CONST. art. 129, translated in FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15, app. A.
397. Shao-Chuan Leng, supra note 240, at 69.
398. P.R.C. CONST. art. 131, translated in FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 15, app. A.
399. Id. art. 133.
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continues to be a problem.' °°
b. Cuba
The Cuban Procuracy was established by Chapter X of the Cu-
ban Constitution, and is elaborated upon in Articles 129 through
133. 401 Unlike the procurates in China, who are appointed by the
corresponding level of government, the Cuban procurates are ap-
pointed by the highest level of government, and are not subject to
local assemblies. 402 The Cuban Procuracy supervises pretrial investi-
gation, has the power to arrest suspects, and is charged with supervis-
ing the prison system.40 3
On the other hand, the Attorney General is appointed by the
National Assembly of People's Power and the Council of State 4 and
is given the authority to draft new legislation it feels necessary to ful-
fill its mission.40 5 Violations of the law by police, and appeals regard-
ing police decisions, are handled exclusively by the Attorney
General.4 6 There is no predecessor to this office in Cuban history.
40
7
IV. MAINTAINING STABILITY WITH A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
The symbolic beginning of the global collapse of communism oc-
curred when the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989°408 and
culminated when the Communist flag was lowered over the Kremlin
in the Soviet Union.409 Today, very few communist nations remain.
Among the most prominent survivors are the People's Republic of
China and the Republic of Cuba.410
There are many possible reasons these two regimes continue to
survive. Significant among the explanations is the revolutionary re-
gimes' use of the law. A revolutionary regime's use of law can be
analogized as two double-edged swords. The first sword symbolizes
400. LENG & CHIU, supra note 41, at 71.
401. CUBA CONST. arts. 130-33.
402. SALAS, supra note 176, at 246.
403. Id.
404. CUBA CONST. art. 131.
405. SALAS, supra note 176, at 246.
406. Id
407. Id
408. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 516 (1992).
409. Michael Parks, Russia Taking Painful Steps to a Free Market, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1992, at Al. The Soviet Union was officially dismantled on January 1, 1992. Id.
410. Other remaining communist nations include Vietnam, North Korea, and Laos. See
Katel, supra note 292, at 39.
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the new regime's relationship with the old regime: on one side, the law
is used to distinguish it from the former one; on the other side, the law
is used to merge the new regime with the legitimate elements of the
prior regime. The second sword symbolizes the new regime's rela-
tionship with its people: one side is used to liberalize the political sys-
tem and encourage participation; the other side is used to oppress
dissent. Although the functions of each sword appear diametric, they
allow the regimes to enjoy the legitimacy of a democratically elected
government, while maintaining the absolute power of a dictatorship.
The successful use of these two "swords" has contributed to the sur-
vival of the revolutionary regimes in the People's Republic of China
and the Republic of Cuba.
A. Legitimizing the Regime with New Laws
The first step toward legitimacy is to distinguish the new regime
from the corrupt elements of the former government. The Castro and
Mao regimes began with the abolition of former laws. In China, Mao
proclaimed that law was a tool of oppression used by the corrupt
Guomindang government. 41 1 The Mao regime promulgated the Com-
mon Program, which abolished all laws and legal institutions of the
Guomindang government, and enacted 148 new laws almost
immediately.4 12
To maintain the semblance of congruity with the old regime,
traditional Chinese principles such as Confucianism, reeducation, re-
habilitation of criminals, the analogy clause,413 the idea that law is for
the protection of the rulers rather than the ruled,414 and the absence
of res judicata, remained as the basis of law under Mao's regime.415
Additionally, the Mao regime permitted Guomindang judges, prose-
cutors, and other legal technicians to remain in office until 1952.416
In Cuba, Castro declared, "we have to destroy the system, de-
stroy its laws, destroy everything, ' 417 in order to disassociate and dis-
tinguish his regime from the brutality of the corrupt Batista regime.
Castro's regime introduced a new court system, which included the
411. Kim, supra note 2, at 413.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 28-38.
413. See supra note 253.
414. See supra text accompanying note 316.
415. See supra text accompanying note 321.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
417. Salas, supra note 2, at 44.
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Popular and Revolutionary Tribunals.41 8 Additionally, the regime
created the Attorney General's Office, which had no counterpart in
Cuban history.
419
Old laws were apparently destroyed in order to distinguish the
new regime from the old, and to ordain the new regime with legiti-
macy. However, as the revolution was institutionalized, regiments of
the old regime either remained, or crept back in. This was a necessary
development because, as human beings are creatures of habit, a citi-
zenry will comply with familiar methods of governing.420 By retain-
ing the shadow of former laws and customs, a revolutionary regime
assures its success.
42'
In Cuba, the Fundamental Law established the same governmen-
tal framework as the Batista dictatorship, giving the president unlim-
ited powers.422 Further, the private practice of law was tolerated until
1974.423 Thus, the laws of the old regime were incorporated with the
new regime, creating the illusion of congruity with established ways of
thinking and acting. In doing this, both regimes were able to ride out
the storm of instability that immediately follows the revolutionary
transformation of a government.
B. Maintaining Stability with the Law
The governments of China and Cuba have used the law to en-
courage the masses to participate in running the country. In China,
the Constitution iterates the notion that all laws are written for the
benefit of the people;424 Mao's regime encouraged students to partici-
pate in purging counter-revolutionaries from the country through the
Red Guards;425 the law schools and legal community were opened to
all by relaxing admission standards, thereby emphasizing political
correctness over competence.
426
In Cuba, the new regime created the Popular Tribunals, a court
system in which ordinary citizens could serve as judges, with little or
no legal training.427 As in China, law schools were open to anyone
418. See supra text accompanying notes 167-9 1.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 404-07.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 153-66.
423. See supra text accompanying note 387.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 61-72.
426. See supra text accompanying note 354.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 180-83.
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who wished to attend.428 Thus, by integrating the legal system with
the population, the people feel a part of the decision-making process
and are less likely to oppose the regime.
However, the law is also used to justify crushing the opposition.
In China, the regime labeled its opponents as "counter-revolution-
aries" and as the "five black elements;" 429 potential opponents were
weeded out during the Hundred Flowers Campaign;430 laws prohibit-
ing demonstrations were issued and enforced;43' the Criminal Code
provided the death penalty for the regime's critics, as well as the
"crime by analogy" clause.4 32 In China, there is no notion of judicial
independence, and the CCP exerts tremendous influence over the
legal system.
In Cuba, the regime created the Revolutionary Courts in order to
deal exclusively with political crime;433 trials dealing with political
crime are held in secret;434 prisons are full of political prisoners, and
the death penalty is used frequently.4 35 Additionally, there is no no-
tion of judicial independence; all judges are appointed by, and are ac-
countable to, the National Assembly.436 All lawyers are employed by
the state and are required to subordinate the interests of their clients
to those of the state.437 In order to teach law, Cuban law professors
must have mastered Marxism, be sympathetic to the communist
revolution, and be appointed by a special tribunal.438 Thus, the legal
system is more a tool for governmental control than a restraint on
government abuses.
V. CONCLUSION
The governments of both Cuba and China were created through
violent revolutions, and were led by charismatic leaders whose per-
sonalities dominate their nations' governments to this day. Both re-
gimes were characterized by numerous constitutions and ad hoc
systems of justice. However, unlike Mao, Castro foresaw the need to
428. See supra text accompanying note 364.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 242-45.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 125-33.
432. See supra text accompanying note 54.
433. See supra text accompanying note 167.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 340-41.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 282-90.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 228-231.
437. See supra text accompanying note 395.
438. See supra text accompanying note 373.
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institutionalize a formal legal system. For Castro, this realization did
not arise from an idealistic desire to broaden participation by the
masses, but rather from the pragmatic realization that, without it, his
regime would fail. Mao did not have to institutionalize the legal sys-
tem during his lifetime because he was a virtual deity in China, and in
no danger of losing his prestige. Chinese leaders after Mao realized
they could no longer rule by charisma, and therefore were compelled
to establish a rule of law. However, the legal systems adopted by both
regimes have done little to provide for judicial independence or de-
mocratization of the law. In Cuba and China the judiciary does not
restrain the conduct of the policy-makers, but rather serves to blindly
enforce government decisions. The legal systems of Cuba and China
have been designed to ensure the continued survival of the revolution-
ary regimes by providing only symbolic public participation, while
concurrently quashing dissent. Many have proclaimed that the day of
the dictator is over, and that the downfall of the communist regimes
of Cuba and China is only a matter of time.439 Such declarations are
unfounded. So long as the regimes maintain the hard line, they will
continue to survive.
William R. Baerg
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